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SUMMARY
Since 1979, China has officially advocated a one-child policy. Mo
tivated by fears that excess population growth would undermine its
modernization efforts, this policy was rigorously pursued in the
early 1980s. Mobilization techniques honed during the Maoist era
were used to enforce rural compliance, but by 1984, campaign
methods were in conflict with the goals of rural reform and the
changing reality of rural life. That conflict, combined with growing
fears of rural instability, led to a progressive relaxation of rural
policy between 1984 and 1989. By 1989, a "one-son or two-child"
policy was in effect in most areas; in other words, couples whose
first child was a daughter gained the right to have a second child
after an interval of several years.
Although this relaxation was designed to strike a balance be
tween state birth plans and peasant child-bearing preferences, it
contributed to a rise in birth rates above planned levels. By 1988,
performance had deteriorated sufficiently to generate open criti
cism of senior officials who had approved the relaxation, but the
policy remained unchanged. The State Family Planning Commis
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sion maintained that the problem was not the policy itself, but
poor enforcement. This remained official policy through the
summer of 1990, despite a more strident tone in the aftermath of
Tiananmen. However, a new campaign was launched to improve
rural compliance, and some localities responded with new regula
tions or directives.
The prospects for improved rural compliance were not good, how
ever. The one-child policy, and China's entire birth planning strate
gy, was premised on the existence of the structures and processes
associated with a centrally planned economy. Although those struc
tures were eroding in rural China in the early 1980s, mobilization
campaigns kept birth rates in check. In the second half of the
1980s, mobilization was replaced by routine administrative enforce
ment, but the conditions which facilitated enforcement during the
commune era no longer existed. First, peasants enjoyed a high
degree of mobility, making it possible to avoid birth planning by
leaving the village permanently or temporarily. Second, cadre-peas
ant relations had undergone a fundamental change. Cadres no
longer monopolized the sources of power and authority in the vil
lage, and the peasants no longer feared them as in the past. As a
result, they were susceptible to economic retaliation and physical
violence from peasants seeking to protect their family's long-term
interests. Third, fiscal reforms led to a reduction in funding for
birth planning work, and forced the family planning bureaucracy,
like other state organs, to seek ways of generating its own reve
nues. The result was perverse: the bureaucracy whose mission was
to prevent excess births relied on fines collected from policy viola
tors to cover its basic operating expenses. In other words, the bu
reaucracy had more than the usual incentive to turn in a mediocre
performance. In addition, fiscal reforms at the township and village
levels left village cadres responsible for collecting the fines, but
often forced them to turn the monies over to higher levels of gov
ernment. This reduced incentives for cadre compliance, and made
it easier and less risky to falsify reports on local birth trends than
to vigorously pursue the policy.
The consequence of these developments has been to relax, but
not release, the grip of the state on rural child-bearing. As the con
flict between the state-planned child-bearing and market reforms
has grown, however, birth planning has encountered the same
problems that have plagued the economy as a whole—incentive
systems are skewed in such a way as to produce "undesirable" be
havior and "irrational" decisions, corruption has flourished, and
scarce resources have been wasted. Whereas future leadership or
regime changes may lead to more fundamental economic or politi
cal reforms, relieving the contradictions between plan and market,
even the most liberal population advisors advocate a two-child
limit. Although the particulars of policy may change, China is un
likely to abandon the principle of state-regulated child-bearing for
a long time to come.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1979, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party was
poised to embark on an ambitious program of reform and modern
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ization. Although the blueprint for reform remained tentative and
incomplete, three elements stood out clearly, even at that early
date. First, the climate of political vigilance and mobilization that
had been fostered during the previous decade had to be relaxed.
Second, the grip of the centralized economic planning apparatus
had to be broken; market incentives were needed to supplement
and rationalize the bureaucratic allocation process, and to stimu
late economic growth. And third, because excessive population
growth threatened to stall or negate economic progress, child-bear
ing had to be subjected to tight planning and control; only one
child per couple could be allowed.
Although the relaxation of political and economic controls sig
nalled a change in state policy, the decision to tighten child-bear
ing controls built on a longstanding policy record. In 1962, the lead
ership of the Chinese Communist Party asserted the primacy of the
state over individual child-bearing decisions and justified interven
tion on economic grounds.1 They embraced the principle of "birth
planning" (jihua shengyu) as well as birth control (jiezhi shengyu),
and shortly thereafter began to draft short- and long-term targets
for population growth.2 Although generally translated as "family
planning" or "planned parenthood," the Chinese concept of jihua
shengyu is broader than the former terms. Like family planning,
birth planning implies conscious household-level decision-making
regarding the number and spacing of children, but it also refers to
a process of comprehensive state planning and regulation of child-
bearing trends. If human reproduction could be regulated in a pre
dictable fashion, it was believed, state plans for economic growth,
employment, social services, and food supplies (to cite only a few
examples) would be easier to develop and implement.3
In practice, the regulation of child-bearing was pursued by sub
jecting population growth to the same principles of centralized ad
ministration that applied to material production. By the early
1970s, annual and five-year targets for population growth were dis
seminated from the center to the localities along with targets for
steel and grain production; party committees and local govern
ments were instructed to make birth planning work a part of their
routine, and to create the appropriate mechanisms for bureaucratic
oversight. State policy on child-bearing converged on a two-child
ideal, and programs that supported pro-natalist tendencies were re
pealed.4
1An abbreviated text of the 1962 directive, "Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu renz-
hen tichang jihua shengyude zhishi" (Central Committee and State Council instructions on en
thusiastically promoting planned birth), can be found in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Population Research Center, Zhongguo renkou nianjian, 1985 (1985 Population yearbook of
China) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1986), p. 14.
2 As early as 1965, for example, Zhou Enlai set a goal of reducing the rate of population
growth to one percent or lower before the end of the twentieth century. Zhou Enlai, "Nongcun
weisheng gongzuo he jihua shengyu wenti" (Rural health work and family planning), in Zhong
guo renkou nianjian, 1985, p. 15.
3 See, for example, Mao Zedong's discussion of birth planning and economic planning in his
speech, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (Speaking Notes)," in
Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman
Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward (Cambridge, Ma: Council on East
Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1989), pp. 159-161.
4 Li Honggui, "Zhongguode renkou zhengce," in Zhongguo renkou nianjian, 1985, pp. 217-218.
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The one-child policy of the 1980s was the direct outgrowth of this
historical approach to fertility reduction —an approach designed
specifically for a centrally planned economy. Just as the policy was
inaugurated in 1979, however, economic reforms began to chip
away at the structures and processes associated with centralized
economic planning, and the state relaxed its extreme political grip
on private behavior. These changes were most evident in the coun
tryside in the early 1980s, where agricultural decollectivization and
decommunization gave the peasantry some measure of economic
power and deflated cadre authority. The result was a rapid im
provement in rural economic performance, but the enforcement of
rural birth limits had never been more difficult.
To enforce a one-child policy during this period of political and
economic transition, the state relied on campaign methods that had
been a mainstay of the Maoist regime. The campaigns mobilized re
luctant cadres to enforce the unpopular regulation, and outside
work teams that were sent into villages brought tremendous pres
sures to bear on rural couples.5 These pressures reached their peak
in 1983, when a massive sterilization campaign targeted all couples
under forty with two or more children. The result was a four-fold
increase in the number of sterilizations and vasectomies in 1983, as
compared with the preceding year, along with a marked increase in
the number of IUD insertions and abortions.6 Within a year, how
ever, the intensity of the campaign had triggered a backlash, and
central policy on rural child-bearing limits began to loosen.7 De
spite the search for a satisfactory balance between the competing
imperatives of market-oriented reform and birth planning, howev
er, the gap between official goals and rural performance widened
steadily in the second half of the 1980s.
II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BIRTH PLANNING POLICY, 1984-1990
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CENTRAL DOCUMENT 7 (1984)
In the spring of 1984 a new central document on birth planning
was issued by the Central Committee and State Council. Consisting
of a report by the party group within the State Family Planning
5 Those pressures ranged from economic and political threats to physical coercion. See John S.
Aird, "Coercion in Family Planning: Causes, Methods, and Consequences," in U.S. Congress,
Joint Economic Committee, China 's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, Volume 1: the Four
Modernizations (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1986), pp. 184-221. Campaigns that were effective in the
short-run, however, could not prevent young couples from eventually having a second child, or
in some cases, a third.
6 Karen Hardee-Cleaveland and Judith Banister, "Fertility Policy and Implementation in
China, 1986-1988," in Population and Development Review 14, No. 2 (June 1988), p. 276; Robert
Delfs, "The Fertility Factor, " Far Eastern Economic Review, July 19, 1990, p. 19.
7 Apparently, the backlash was experienced at the central level in part through a large
volume of letters "inquiring" about the campaign or complaining about implementation meth
ods. In a 1986 document on family planning (discussed below), one passage documents the im
provement in cadre work methods by noting that the number of letters from the "masses" had
declined by 75 percent between 1983, the peak year, and 1985. For the text of Central Document
13 (1986), entitled "Guanyu 'liuwu' qijian jihua shengyu gongzuo qingkuang he 'qiwu' qijian
gongzuo yijiande bapgao" (Report on the state of birth planning work during the sixth five-year
plan period and opinions on work during the seventh five-year plan period), see Guojia jihua
shengyu weiyuanhui xuanzhuan jiaoyu si, Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao jihua shengyu
weiyuanhui, Shiyizhou sanzhong quanhui yilai jihua shengyu zhongyao wenjian xuanbian (Prop
aganda and Education Office of the State Family Planning Commission, Central Party School
Family Planning Commission, Selected Important Documents on Birth Planning since the Third
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee), Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe (Central
Party School Publishers), 1989, pp. 27-35.
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Commission (SFPC) and a statement of concurrence by the Central
Committee, the document made clear that strict birth limits would
continue to be enforced. At the same time, however, the need for
rural political stability was stressed; methods that provoked a seri
ous peasant backlash and endangered their enthusiasm for reform
were to be modified in a way that would make them "acceptable to
the peasants." 8 More specifically, the document signalled a shift in
policy in four important respects.
1. Coercion.
The SFPC report admitted that coercion was a serious problem
in the implementation of birth planning work. In keeping with the
tenor of the central-level party rectification campaign that had
been launched in October 1983, the party group took the blame for
problems with "coercion and commandism," admitting that they
had not paid enough attention to their "work style" or adopted "re
medial measures." 9 They also admitted that the demands made on
localities in the implementation of the sterilization campaign in
1983 were too severe, and that the problems began at the top:
In those places where coercion exists, and no immediate
solution has been found, the main responsibility is ours.
We believed that because birth planning work tasks are
heavy, the appearance of coercion was unavoidable. 1°
With regard to future work, cadres were instructed to avoid rigid
and uniform implementation, or "one cut of the knife" (yidaoqie).
Births outside the plan were to be "resolutely checked," but han
dling the problem "simplistically" was deemed unacceptable. Steri
lization was still to be "promoted" on the "principle of volunta
rism," but lower levels were not to be pressured with unrealistical-
ly high targets. In short, cadres were exhorted to continue to take
birth planning and birth targets seriously. At the same time, they
were reminded that birth planning work consisted of more than
the periodic use of administrative pressure and compulsion, and
they were urged to invest in a more comprehensive approach to the
problem.
2. Allowances for second births.
Central Document 7 also marked a turn in policy by increasing
the proportion of households that would be allotted a second child.
In 1982, the quota for second births had been limited to "under five
percent" of all couples; in 1984, the quota was expanded to "about
ten percent." 11 On its own, this small increase was little more
than a cosmetic adjustment to the one-child limit, one much too
small to address peasant grievances. The document went further,
however. It stated that additional concessions would be made as
the rate of forbidden "multiple births" (duotai) declined, a policy
that became known as "opening a small hole to close a large hole '
8 Central Document 7 (1984) is entitled "Guanyu jihua shengyu gongzuo qingkuangde huibao"
(Report on the situation in birth planning work). The text may be found in Jihua shengyu zhon-
gyao wenjian (Selected important documents on birth planning), pp. 15-25.
9 Ibid., pp. 18-23.
"Ibid., p. 22.
i ' Ibid., p. 20.
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(i.e., increasing allotments for a second birth in order to reduce the
number of third or higher parity births).12 This provision opened
the door to further relaxations of the one-child limit after 1984, in
cluding experiments in some localities with a rural two-child
policy.
3. The primacy of rural reform.
In a provision regarding economic penalties for policy violators,
the document made clear that family planning was not to take
precedence over the requirements for rural reform and develop
ment. It explicitly prohibited "infringing upon or destroying the
masses' basic means of production or basic means of subsistence"
in order to invoke penalties.13 This new insistence that the imple
mentation of family planning not interfere directly with peasant
livelihood or economic production echoed the thrust of another
policy document —Central Document 1 (1984). This document, one
in a series of crucial agricultural reform documents in the early
1980s, included two elements that had a direct bearing on the im
plementation of birth planning in the countryside.14 First, the doc
ument called for fifteen year leases on agricultural land; the long-
term leases were designed to increase peasant security in their
land-holding contracts and encourage investment in agricultural
growth. From the perspective of family planning, however, long-
term leases made it more difficult to reward one-child couples with
extra land allotments. In areas where cadres continued to recog
nize the land-holding benefit in principle, they were reluctant to
enforce it without explicit orders to do so.15 In other areas, the em
phasis on stability and agricultural growth forced changes in birth
planning regulations that eliminated the landholding benefit. 1 6
Second, to boost peasant enthusiasm and reduce their tax
burden, the document called for a reform of township-level fi
nances. Family planning was one of several "government-subsi
dized projects" specifically targeted for reform; the goal was to
reduce excessive expenditures like those incurred in the 1983 steri
lization campaign,17 and to place more of the funding burden on
local governments. This reform signalled localities that economic
growth took precedence over other central directives. Family plan
ning, however heavily it was stressed in Beijing, could not be al
lowed to absorb revenues that might otherwise be invested profit
ably.18
4- The relationship between modernization and fertility levels.
The document stressed the "modernization first" theme by in
verting the standard argument on the relationship between eco
nomic development and birth planning. Over the previous five
2 Ibid., p. 20.
3 Ibid., p. 21.
4 For the translated text of the document, see China Quarterly 101 (March 1985), pp. 132-142.
5 Interview with former township-level birth planning official, July 1990.
6 Susan Greenhalgh, The Evolution of the One-Child Policy in Shaanxi Province, 1979-1988,
Working Paper No. 5 (New York: The Population Council, 1989), p. 37.
17 In Wuhan municipality, for example, the 1983 annual budget for birth planning was
600,000 yuan, but one million yuan was spent on the sterilization campaign alone. Interview
with municipal family planning officials, June 1984.
18 The consequences of this reform are discussed fully in section III, part C, of this paper.
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years, propaganda on the one-child policy had stressed that China's
modernization effort was dependent on induced fertility control.
Without strict birth limits, it was argued, China's development
gains would be largely offset by increases in population. In Central
Document 7, however, a more complex relationship was implied.
The text stated that "high birth rates are a reflection of economic
and cultural backwardness," and that "the reasons why the masses
demand additional births are many-faceted." 19 This tentative ac
knowledgement that a decline in fertility levels in the countryside
might result from the process of development, not fuel it
,
paved the
way for a relaxation of rural birth limits during the second half of
the 1980s.
B. BIRTH PLANNING POLICY DURING THE SEVENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN,
1986-1990
1. Policy relaxation and plan goals.
Although the one-child limit was strictly implemented in urban
areas throughout the 1980s, after 1984 the policy was progressively
relaxed in rural areas. The allowance for a second birth in the
countryside was increased from "about ten percent" of all single-
child households in 1984 to twenty percent in 1985. In 1986, the
first year of the Seventh Five- Year Plan (FYP) period, the quota
was raised to fifty percent, and an important new category became
eligible for a second child —single-daughter households (dunu hu).20
Over the next few years, provinces were given substantial leeway
to determine when and where to implement the provisions for al
lowing a second birth, including the newly added category. By 1988,
fourteen provinces and autonomous regions had declared rural
single-daughter households to be eligible for a second child, while
six other provinces and municipalities did not.21 In May 1988, how
ever, the SFPC declared that it was national policy to grant a
second child to single-daughter households; localities wishing to im
plement a more restrictive policy had to apply to the SFPC for ap
proval.22 By mid-1989, four policy categories had emerged: 1) a two-
child policy, operative in six provinces and autonomous regions
(Guangdong, Hainan, Yunnan, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang); 2)
a "one-son or two-child" policy, operative in eighteen provinces,
plus less developed areas in Jiangsu and Sichuan; 3) a policy of lim
ited concessions for second births, operative in Beijing, Tianjin,
Shanghai, and most rural areas in Jiangsu and Sichuan; 4) a policy
19 "Guanyu jihua shengyu gongzuo," p. 21.
20 The new provision was a concession to peasant preferences for son, but those couples who
gave birth to a second daughter were not allowed a third child. Hu Angang, "Zhongguo renkou
shikongde yuanyin ji duice" (Reasons and Countermeasures for China's Runaway Population)
Liaowang Zhoubao haiwaiban (Outlook overseas edition) 10 (March 6, 1989), pp 17-18. A second
source sets the 1986 quota for second births at sixty percent of rural single-child households. See
Wang Yan, Liu Jinghuai, Zhao Derun, Ouyang Huijun, Fang Jinyu, "Renkou wenti yao zhuajin
zai zhuajin" (Population problems must be grasped more and more firmly), Liaowang 28, July
13, 1987, p. 14.
21 Hu, "Zhongguo renkou shikongde yuanyin," p. 51.
22 Peng Peiyun, "Zai quanguo jihua shengyu weiyuanhui zhuren huiyi bimushide jianghua"
(Speech at the close of the national meeting of directors of family planning commissions), in
Jihua shengyu zhongyao wenjian, pp. 108-120; Zeng Yi, "Family Planning Program 'Tightening
Up'?" Population and Development Review 2 (June 1989), p. 335.
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of two or more births per couple, operative among minority nation
alities.23
The relaxation and decentralization of birth planning policy
after 1986 reflected a subtle shift in central priorities. In contrast
to the Sixth FYP, emphasis on family planning was distinctly
downgraded in the Seventh. In the Sixth FYP, birth planning and
population growth were discussed in conjunction with raising in
comes and living standards; their importance to the overall mod
ernization process was heavily stressed. In the Seventh FYP and
Zhao's explanatory work report, however, they are relegated to the
category of "other social programmes," a catch-all category at the
end of a list of economic priorities. Similarly, Zhao's speech to the
13th Party Congress in October 1987 grouped birth planning with
environmental protection as a serious social issue —one that re
quired political commitment but commanded few resources.24 In
addition, China's official population target for the year 2000 was
revised; the original goal of holding population "under 1.2 billion"
was changed to "about 1.2 billion," a change soon understood to
mean 1.25 billion.25
Despite the more moderate tone, the goals set forth in the Sev
enth FYP remained extremely ambitious. The primary target was
set forth in a new directive on family planning; Central Document
13 (1986) called for an average annual rate of population growth of
"about 12.5 per thousand." 26 This translated into a total popula
tion target of 1.113 billion by 1990, and both targets were regis
tered in the final draft of the Seventh FYP. By 1988, however, it
became clear that the population would exceed the target by a sub
stantial margin, and a different kind of backlash began to occur.
2. Hardline offensive and open debate.
As early as 1984, a heated debate over the one-child limit broke
out among social scientists and policy advisers in China. Some ex
perts urged a change in rural policy to allow two children per
couple.27 Others, however, voiced their opposition to any relaxation
of the one-child limit; they believed that the combination of policy
instability and rural concessions would encourage child-bearing
23 Zeng, ibid., p. 335.
24 For the text of the Seventh Five-Year Plan and Zhao's report, see Beijing Review 16 (1986).
For the reference to family planning in Zhao's speech at the 13th Party Congress, see Zhao
Ziyang, "Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," Beijing Review
(November 9-15, 1987): X.
25 The relaxation of the 1.2 billion figure apparently originated in July 1984, when a report
was submitted to the Central Committee entitled, "Some Questions On Population Control and
Population Policy" (Renkou kongzhi yu renkou zhengce zhong ruogan wenti), in Ma Bin, Lun
Zhongguo renkou wenti (Discussion of China's Population Problem), Zhongguo guoji guangbo
chubanshe (China international broadcast publishers) (Beijing: 19871, p. 2. Subsequently, Wang
Wei, then head of the SFPC, used the new formulation of "about 1.2 billion" in a speech at the
Central Party School in November 1985. See Wang Wei, "Zai 'Qiwu' qijian ba jihua shengyu
gongzuo zhuade geng jin geng hao" (Grasp birth planning work more firmly and better during
the seventh five-year plan period), in Jihua shengyu zhongyao wenjian, p. 68.
26 For the text of Central Document 13, see Jihua shengyu zhongyao wenjian xuanbian, pp.
27-35.
27 Peng Peiyun, "Zai quanguo jihua shengyu weiyuanhui," p. 113. Although this alternative
has never been accepted by the Chinese government, its popularity among Chinese scholars was
fueled by a 1985 article by John Bongaarts and Susan Greenhalgh entitled, "An Alternative to
the OneJChild Policy in China," Population and Development Review 11, No. 4 (December 1985),
pp. 585-617. For a discussion of its influence and the diverse views held within the community
of Chinese scholars, see Susan Greenhalgh, "Population Studies in China: Privileged Past, Anx
ious Future," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 24 (July 1990), pp. 357-384.
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beyond the official limits.28 When rising birth rates in 1986 and
1987 confirmed their worst fears, these critics were quick to re
spond. In a series of newspaper articles and other publications,
they complained about the "human wave" that was "washing over
China," and attributed it directly to the negligence of policy
makers.29 They argued that it was a serious mistake to loosen
rural restrictions on a second birth, and complained that the inter
ference of a few officials had led to the crisis. To stem the flood, at
least one author openly advocated the use of coercion to overcome
the resistance of the peasantry.30
These open criticisms prompted a rebuttal from Peng Peiyun,
Wang Wei's successor as head of the SFPC. In 1988, she and other
senior officials insisted that the policy relaxation had not been a
mistake; instead, they argued that rising birth rates were a func
tion of 1) an increase in the child-bearing age cohort, and 2) poor
implementation of policy in some areas.31 In taking this position,
they were backed by the authority of the Standing Committee of
the Politburo, which had met the previous March to discuss family
planning. The Standing Committee members reaffirmed the exist
ing policy on birth limits, arguing that the policy of allowing
single-daughter households to have a second child 1) facilitated
rural implementation, 2) prevented female infanticide, 3) generated
a positive international reaction, and 4) contributed to the realiza
tion of population control targets by reducing the number of third
births.32
This high-level commitment to the "existing policy" was reiterat
ed in 1989 and 1990. To mark China's arrival at the 1.1 billion pop
ulation mark in April 1989, a Renmin Ribao editorial stressed that
the "key" to family planning work was to implement the "exist
ing" policy "100 percent," implicitly rejecting calls for a tightening
of policy.33 Despite a reactionary speech by Jiang Zemin in Octo
ber 1989, after the Tiananmen crackdown, this remained the basic
policy line through the summer of 1990.34 In February 1990, Jiang
Zemin and Li Peng stressed the need to implement "existing
policy" in a letter to the national meeting of family planning direc
tors.35 And in July 1990, Li Ruihuan reiterated the importance of
"adhering to the established family planning policies." 36
28 Wang Wei, "Zai 'qiwu' qijian," p. 69.
29 Xie Zhenjiang, "There is No Route of Retreat," Jingji Ribao, January 24, 1989, p. 3, in
FBIS, February 15, 1989, pp. 35-37; Liu Jingzhi, "Experts Concerned Are Not Optimistic About
China's Population Situation, and Think That Interference by Officials is an Important Reason
Why Birth Rate Has Risen Again," Guangming Ribao, March 6, 1988, p. 2, in FBIS, March 6,
1988, pp. 14-15.
30 Xie, "No Route of Retreat," p. 37.
31 China Daily, April 19, 1988, p. 1; see also Peng, "Zai quanguo jihua shengyu weiyuanhui,"
pp. 108-120.
32 Peng, ibid., p. 112.
33 Renmin Ribao, April 14, 1989, p. 1. See also, Peng Peiyun, "Controlling Population En
riches the Nation and Makes People Strong," Liaowang 1 (January 1, 1990), in FBIS, April 24,
1990, p. 53.
34 According to a report in by Tammy Tan in the Hongkong Standard, (October 16, 1989, p. 6),
Peng Peiyun read a speech by Jiang at a national symposium in Hangzhou. In it, he reportedly
attributed Western criticism of China's birth planning policy to the belief of international busi
nessmen that a larger population would mean higher profits. FBIS, October 20, 1989, p. 26-27.
35 Zhongguo renkou bao, February 16, 1990, p. 1.
36 He was speaking to a forum of advanced family planning workers. Xinhua, July 4, 1990, in
FBIS, July 27, 1990, pp. 14-16.
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Nevertheless, anxieties about population growth became more
pronounced in 1989 and 1990. They were fueled by the results of a
1988 sample survey that revealed a 1987 population growth rate of
16.16 per thousand, nearly two percentage points higher than the
officially reported rate of 14.39 per thousand.37 This figure raised
doubts about China's ability to meet the targets set forth in the
Seventh FYP, as well as the long-range target of about 1.25 billion.
As a result, in late 1988 the target was revised upward to 1.27 bil
lion. By early 1990, however, even this figure appeared optimistic;
China's total population at the end of 1989 exceeded the Seventh
FYP target figure for 1990, adding fuel to the hardline argument
for tighter child-bearing limits.38 Rather than change official
policy, however, a new campaign was launched to improve perform
ance under the existing policy. Some provinces issued new regula
tions or special directives, and expert advisors proposed new meas
ures to improve rural performance.39 The question, however, was
whether any set of measures would significantly improve rural en
forcement.
II. MARKET REFORM VERSUS BIRTH PLANNING: IMPEDIMENTS TO
RURAL IMPLEMENTATION
When the one-child policy was announced by state officials in
1979, it was premised on three assumptions. The first assumption
was that governmental regulation of child-bearing decisions was a
necessary and valid exercise of state power. Second, it assumed
that birth planning would be subsumed within the process of cen
tralized economic planning; population figures and birth targets
could be disaggregated and assigned to localities in the same way
that economic targets were assigned. Third, it assumed that an ef
fective system of social and political control was in place —one that
restricted population movement, facilitated ideological indoctrina
tion, and imposed behavioral norms. A decade later, the state con
tinued to assert the right to set strict child-bearing limits, but the
context for implementation had undergone dramatic change, espe
cially in the countryside. The political and economic controls asso
ciated with centralized economic planning were significantly weak
ened, while partial market reforms created irrational reward struc
tures that worked against the state's anti-natal goals. In that con
text, the gap between state birth plans and grassroots performance
began to widen.40
37 Renmin Ribao, October 28, 1988, p. 3. The survey was conducted jointly by the SFPC, the
State Statistical Bureau, the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and the
Public Security Bureau.
38 Shih Chun-yu, "NPC Deputies Say the Population Problem is Serious," Ta Kung Boo, April
3, 1990, p. 2, in FBIS, April 9, 1990, p. 34.
39 Henan province approved a law on family planning in April 1990. Henan ribao, May 10,
1990, p. 9, in FBIS, June 1, 1990, pp. 36-42. Fujian province issued a party and government direc
tive to shore up implementation of the existing regulations. Fujian ribao, March 25, 1990, p. 4,
in FBIS, May 11, 1990, pp. 42-45. On new measures for enforcement, see Zhongguo tongxun she,
July 21, 1990, in FBIS, July 23, 1990, p. 31.
40 The declining reliability of the statistical reporting system made it difficult to estimate the
precise extent of the problem. The national census that was conducted on July 1, 1990, may help
to clarify China's demographic standing as it moves into the last decade of the twentieth centu
ry. The census results were not available at the time this article was written, however.
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A. PEASANT MOBILITY
During the Maoist era, a tight network of controls over mobility
and food supply kept peasant laborers tied closely to the villages.
The lack of mobility facilitated close surveillance of child-bearing
age couples, and pressures to conform were extremely difficult to
resist. To encourage the development and commercialization of the
rural economy, restrictions on peasant movement were progressive
ly relaxed during the 1980s. Large numbers began to move into
urban areas as private entrepreneurs or temporary workers; others
simply moved out of their native villages to nearby towns and
small cities. By 1990, it was estimated that this "floating popula
tion" numbered more than 20 million.41
The increase in peasant mobility vastly complicated the job of
enforcing even a two-child limit. Once rural couples moved beyond
the jurisdiction of their native village or township, local authorities
had neither the ability or the incentive to monitor pregnancy and
child-bearing. In towns and cities where migrant laborers congre
gated, however, local family planning organs were also unable to
control their behavior. In some areas, the bureaucracy simply did
not have the personnel or economic means to deal with the logisti
cal problems posed by a scattered migrant population; in others
their work was thwarted by powerful employers anxious to retain
cheap peasant labor. The result was the growth of an "excess birth
guerrilla corps" that produced a large "illegal" population.42
To counter this problem, the state proposed to substitute indirect
regulation for direct administrative control. Beginning in 1987,
local branches of the state bureaucracy for commerce and industry
were instructed to withhold work permits from individuals who vio
lated the birth limitation policy. Peasants were required to present
proof of compliance, and local bureaus were forbidden to issue
work papers without this evidence.43 These procedures were easily
skirted, however. Local commerce and industry officials had no in
terest in becoming adjunct family planning officials, and as the
number of migrants increased, fewer and fewer bothered to register
locally or acquire the obligatory work permit.44 By 1990, certain lo
calities had gained a reputation for being safe havens from family
planning enforcement.45
41 Xinhua, June 15, 1990, in FBIS. June 18, 1990, p. 37; Zhang Mengyi, "A New Mode of Pop
ulation Shift and Mobility in China," Liaowang Overseas Edition 2 (January 8, 1990), pp. 16-17,
in FBIS, February 9, 1990, pp. 18-20.
42 Guo Xiao, "The 'Population Explosion' is Drawing Near," Jingji ribao (Economic daily),
January 10, 1989, in FBIS, February 3, 1989, p. 51; Fan Xiangguo and Huang Yuan, "Zhongguo
'hei renkou'" (China's illegal population), Xin guancha (New Observer) 4 (February 25, 1989, pp.
28-32; Report, "Couples with more than One Child Seek Shelter Along Borders of Hunan,
Hubei, Sichuan, and Guizhou," Zhongguo tongxun she (January 20, 1989), in JPRS-CAR 89-014,
February 15, 1989, pp. 44-45.
43 De Ming, "China's Population Situation Remains Grim," Liaowang Overseas Edition 17
(April 1988), pp. 9-10, in FBIS, May 11, 1988, p. 28.
44 Those who did were more likely to have used corruption and bribery to acquire the neces
sary certificates. Pei Gang, "Thoughts on the Present Disarray in Matters of Population Repro
duction and Suggested Improvements," Renkou yu Jingji (Population and economics) 5 (October
25, 1990), pp. 6-10, in JPRS-CAR 90-010, February 7, 1990, p. 65.
45 Report, "Couples with more than One Child Seek Shelter," pp. 44-45.
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B. CADRE-PEASANT RELATIONS
A second dilemma for rural enforcement was the changing politi
cal climate within the villages. In some localities, powerful village
leaders were still able to rule with an iron fist; in others, however,
political and economic reforms forced village leaders to be far more
circumspect in the exercise of power.
Unlike the commune era, village leaders no longer had a com
plete monopoly over economic resources or opportunities; neither
could they count on an unlimited tenure in office. As a result, poli
cies that provoked peasant opposition (e.g., enforcing birth limits or
extracting state and local taxes) were handled with caution, and
for good reason. Peasant retaliation or aggressive resistance was a
real possibility, and "incidents of revenge" ranged from destruction
of cadre property to physical attack.46 Moreover, village leaders
were far more vulnerable to peasant retaliation than were their
township superiors; they rarely moved on to higher-level posts out
side the village, and they no longer had guaranteed tenure in
office. As a result, they and their families had to live with the
legacy of their political tenure, in a post-reform social environment
where household size and community status were closely linked.
Families who saw child-bearing as their best long-term guarantee
of strength, respect and stature (and their best defense against
weakness, bullying and abuse by powerful families), believed that
birth limits represented a profound threat to their existence within
the village. Some were prepared to take any steps necessary, in
cluding the use of force, to protect that future, and cadres were
hesitant to stand in their way.47
C. FISCAL REFORM AND FAMILY PLANNING FUNDING
Though rarely discussed in the context of China's family plan
ning efforts, fiscal reforms implemented since 1984 have had a tre
mendous impact on the program. The fiscal reforms encouraged fi
nancial neglect of family planning at the village and township
levels, and contributed to a chronic shortage of funding for family
planning work.
Until 1984, the costs of contraceptives and all family planning-
related medical procedures (IUD insertions, abortions, steriliza
tions, etc.) were covered within the central state budget. All other
expenses (e.g., costs of preparing and disseminating propaganda
materials, work subsidies for village cadres and activists involved
in mobilization campaigns) were absorbed by local governments or
rural villages, whether or not they exceeded budgeted expendi
tures. In 1984, however, Beijing mandated a reorganization of
township-level finances; family planning was one of several catego
ries of local expenses targeted for reduction and rationalization.48
48 Su Suining. "There are Many Causes of strained Relations Between Cadres and Masses in
Rural Areas," Nongmin ribao (Peasant daily), September 26, 1988, p. 1, in FBIS, October 7, 1988,
p. 13; Fan and Huang, "Zhongguo 'hei' renkou," p. 71.
47 Yang, "Woguo nongcun jihua shengyu gongzuo zhong xuyao yanjiu jiejuede jige wenti"
(Several issues in need of resolution in our country's rural birth planning work), Renkou yanjiu
(Population research) 6 (1989),pp. 62-64; Pei, "Thoughts on the Present Disarray," p. 65.
48 See footnote 14.
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The impetus for fiscal reform was two-fold. First, central authori
ties sought to reduce the level of "peasant burdens" (nongmin
fudan), i.e., the sum of all direct and indirect forms of taxation.
Still uncertain in late 1983 how rapidly agricultural performance
would improve, they feared that licit and illicit extractions by local
cadres could stifle peasant entrepreneurship and impede the
reform process.49 Second, the reform of local government expendi
tures was part of a larger effort to reduce central-level budgetary
commitments and decentralize fiscal authority. By 1984, new reve
nue-sharing arrangements had been negotiated with individual
provinces. As a result, provincial governments gained control over
the structure of local spending, and the right to determine their
own fiscal arrangements with local governments under their juris
diction.50 In turn, counties eventually gained the right to set fiscal
arrangements with township governments, placing all levels of gov
ernment on "harder" budgetary constraints.51
This comprehensive reform of the fiscal system had far-reaching
implications for the overall pattern of government spending and in
vestment, and for specific budgetary categories like family plan
ning. As governments gained greater control over their budgetary
revenues, governmental bureaus and commercial enterprises were
pressured to balance their budgets and generate their own sources
of revenue for reinvestment or expansion. As more responsibilities
were transferred from the central budget to local authorities,
therefore, the solvency of local governments came to depend on
their entrepreneurial abilities. Government activities that did not
generate a profit were often neglected, while profit-making ven
tures attracted more investment.52 Agencies that could not com
pete on the market were starved for funds, and came under in
creased pressure to find their own sources of revenue simply to
maintain their existing operations.53
In that climate, the family planning bureaucracy found itself
strapped for funds during the Seventh FYP, just as the pressures of
an increasing child-bearing age cohort demanded increased invest
ment. In late 1986, SFPC director Wang Wei complained that fund
ing for family planning had dropped off after 1983; he criticized
49 On the problem of "peasant burdens," see Tyrene White, "Below Bureaucracy: The Burden
of Being a Village Under the Local State," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Asso
ciation for Asian Studies, Chicago, Illinois, April 6-8, 1990.
5o James Tong, "Fiscal Reform, Elite Turnover and Central-Provincial Relations in Post-Mao
China," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 22 (July 1989), pp. 13-14.51 The arrangements that provincial governments and prefectural governments, between pre
fectures and counties, and between counties and townships, can and do vary from one locality
and the next. This had created an exceedingly complex set of financial arrangements at the
local levels. See, for example, "Hebei sheng renmin zhengfu guanyu gaijin caizheng guanli tiz-
hide jixiang guiding" (Some regulations of the Hebei provincial government concerning improv
ing the financial management system), Hebei jingji tongji nianjian, 1987 (Hebei economic statis
tical yearbook, 1987), p. 488; Zhonggong hebei shengwei yanjiushi nongcunchu, "Fangshou rang
xiang zhengfu dang jiali cai" (Let go and allow township governments to set up their own fi
nances), Nongcun gongzuo tongxun (Rural work bulletin) 6 (1986), pp. 32-33. On the distinction
between "hard" and ' soft" budget constraints, see Janos Kornai, Contradictions and Dilemmas:
Studies on the Socialist Economy and Society (Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 1986).
52 On the role of township governments in developing profit-making township enterprises, see
Jean C. Oi, "Economic Management and Rural Government: Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship in
Local Economies," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies,
Chicago, Illinois, April 6-8, 1990.
53 Christine Wong, "Tax Reform and Central-Local Fiscal Interaction in China," paper pre
sented at the East Asia Colloquia Series, Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard
University, July 1990; White, "Below Bureaucracy."
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"some provinces" for drastically reducing their allocation for
family planning, and called on them to give priority to family plan
ning in future budgets.54 By 1988, delegates to the annual meeting
of family planning commission directors were pressing central lead
ers for increased funding and personnel. Premier Li Peng's re
sponse, however, was to remind them of the "financial difficulties"
with the central budget and request that local governments carry
even more of the financial burden for family planning.55 This left
family planning officials to complain publicly about the lack of sup
port at all levels of government. One provincial FPC director was
quoted as saying: "During the past few years, we spent half our
time lobbying government leaders at all levels. They should take
the lead in family planning, but we end up having to push them
into action." 56
The lack of funds to maintain and develop the family planning
bureaucracy had serious and paradoxical consequences for rural
enforcement. First, family planning work was slowed in some areas
due to lack of funding for medical support. In areas where the
family planning organization sought to establish medical facilities
independent of local hospitals, no funds were available to expand
meager facilities.57 In other areas, local governments did not reim
burse hospitals for the cost of sterilization surgeries or other proce
dures; as a result, the hospitals refused to accept additional family
planning patients until the debt was paid.58 One report claimed
that "many" provincial governments owed public health depart
ments "up to 10 million yuan" in tubal ligation surgery fees. To
place this sum in relative perspective, one family planning director
pointed out that 100 million yuan had been spent to renovate the
hotel where a family planning meeting had been held. He added,
"How come funds just dry up when it conies to family plan
ning?" 59
Second, the family planning bureaucracy came to rely upon the
extraction of fines from policy violators in order to cover ordinary
operating costs; to pursue its bureaucratic mission of preventing
excess births, the bureaucracy needed the monies collected as a
result of excess births. In one Sichuan county, for example, the gap
between budgeted allocations and actual expenditures during the
1979-1987 period was 606,000 yuan annually. To cover the deficit,
the county relied on the collection of excess birth fees, making it
bureaucratically imperative that couples violate the birth limita
tion policy.60 Conversely, counties that were very successful in pre
54 Wang Wei, "Jihua shengyu gongzuo qingkuang" (Situation in family planning work), Jihua
shengyu zhongyao wenjian, p. 100.
55 Li Peng, "Zai tingchu quanguo jihua shengyu weiyuanhui zhuren huiyi huibao shide
jianghua" (Talk while listening to the report of the national meeting of directors of family plan
ning commissions), Jihua shengyu zhongyao wenjian, p. 62.
56 Zhu Li, "Family Planning to Emphasize Economic as Well as Administrative Methods,"
Jingji Cankao (Economic Reference), March 10, 1989, p. 4, in JPRS 89-047, May 17, 1989, p. 39.
57 Cheng Linli and Wu Yousheng, "Jiceng jihua shengyu gongzuode fancha xiaoyi yu sikao"
(Contrasting effects of basic-level family planning work and reflections), Renkou yanjiu 6 (1989),
p. 53.
58 Cheng and Wu, "Jiceng jihua shengyu," p. 53.
59 Zhu, "Family Planning," p. 39.
60 Cheng and Wu, "Jiceng jihua shengyu," pp. 53-54.
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venting excess births soon recognized the benefit of turning in a
more mediocre performance.61
Despite the economic incentive to allow excess child-bearing,
however, mobilizational pressures to comply with the one-or-two
child limit did not cease. Instead, campaigns—presumably the an
tithesis of routine bureaucratic process —became an essential com
ponent of routine bureaucratic process, and targets for fine collec
tions were issued alongside targets for births, sterilizations, and
abortions.62 In one prefecture, campaigns of this type were held
three times a year on a regular basis. The collection of fines was
one of six key targets issued to each locality.63 The collection of
fines by no means guaranteed that the money would be used to
reward one-child couples or provide better family planning serv
ices, however. Township and village leaders sometimes took advan
tage of murky accounting procedures at the grassroots to divert the
funds to other projects.64
Third, fiscal reforms and fiscal austerity contributed indirectly to
the deteriorating quality of China's population statistics. Despite
the pressures on grassroots cadres to collect fines, monies raised at
the village level were often turned over to higher levels of govern
ment. In one Sichuan county, for example, township governments
received 70 percent of all monies collected as fines, the district (qu)
received 5 percent, the county received 20 percent, and the prefec
ture received 5 percent.65 Elsewhere, villages were allowed to
retain a portion of the fees, but sometimes as little as 20 percent.66
This arrangement denied village cadres the fruits of their own
labors, and reinforced their distaste for family planning work.67
Since village leaders were required to undertake the difficult and
dangerous job of extracting the levies, but not necessarily allowed
to retain them, they had no incentive to accurately report local
birth trends.68
By the end of the decade, the erosion of the statistical reporting
system was one of the most serious issues on the family planning
agenda. The statistical "leakage" (shuifen), or exaggeration, begins
at the village level, where grassroots reports lay the foundation for
nationwide compilations of population trends.69 Since those reports
can only be verified by village cadres who are intimately familiar
with village households, the reporting system has always been sus
ceptible to fraud and human error. Since 1985, however, the costs
of accurate reporting have grown, while the risks of falsification
have declined. As a result, fraud and misreporting have spread to
all levels of the system, and political leaders enjoying recognition
for their "advanced" family planning work have no incentive to
question positive reports from subordinates who are anxious to
61 Cheng yicai, "Chaosheng zinufei guanli tanwei" (Inquiry into the management of excess
birth fines) Renkou yanjiu (Population research) 4 (1990), p. 61.
62 Elsewhere, I have called this phenomenon "institutionalized mobilization." See "Postrevolu-
tionary Mobilization in China: The One-Child Policy Reconsidered," World Politics (October
1990).
63 Interview with former township-level family planning cadre, July 1990.
64 Chen, "Chaosheng zinufei," pp. 61-62.
65 Cheng and Wu, "Jiceng jihua shengyu," pp. 53-54.
66 Chen, "Chaosheng zinufei," p. 61.
67 Ibid., p. 61.
88 Ibid., p. 61.
69 Renmin ribao, October 24, 1988, p. 3.
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please.70 Similarly, enthusiastic family planning cadres who uncov
er statistical errors feel strong pressures to cover them up. As one
former cadre put it, an honest report from one township would ac
complish nothing but the destruction of one's own career, since
higher-level political leaders would be embarrassed and angered by
the revelation.71
The joint survey conducted in 1988 under the auspices of the
SFPC revealed just how serious the statistical problems had
become by that time. As shown in Table 1, the survey revealed that
the majority of all provinces, municipalities and autonomous re
gions had birth rates at least 30 percent higher than originally re
ported for 1987. Despite demands for a more rigorous reporting
system, however, in early 1990, SFPC director Peng Peiyun stated
that there was a thirty percent gap between household registration
figures and actual population size, and that the discrepancy was in
creasing, not decreasing.72 This did not bode well for the upcoming
national census in July 1990. As preparations got underway in the
late spring, therefore, cadres were issued a carrot-and-stick ultima
tum: if the census report was accurate, there would be no recrimi
nations, even if the figures implied previous statistical fraud; if the
census report was tampered with or poorly prepared, however, the
repercussions would be severe.73 How cadres responded to these
warnings in not yet clear, but it is reasonable to assume that they
were skeptical of Beijing's amnesty offer.74
TABLE 1. Percentage Differences in 1987 Birth










Although Beijing continues to exert formidable pressures on
child-bearing age couples, the state's ability to enforce rural child-
bearing limits has eroded since 1984. China's birth planning strate
gy was originally tailored to the political and economic processes
associated with a command economy. For birth planning to be ef
fective, fertility and population targets had to be disseminated
along with material production targets, and local cadres had to be
0 Yang, "Woguo nongcun jihua shengyu gongzuo," p. 64.
1 Interview with former township-level family planning cadre, July 1990.
1 Xinhua, December 13, 1989, in FBIS, January 5, 1990, p. 5.
3 Beijing Domestic Service, March 21, 1990, in FBIS, April 17, 1990, pp. 24-25.
4 Based on one report from Liaoning, that skepticism was probably well-founded. Just after
the census was completed, a provincial radio report revealed that significant statistical errors
had been uncovered in some localities, and that some "advanced" units did not deserve the title.
See Liaoning Provincial Service, July 14, 1990, in FBIS, July 17, 1990, p. 45.
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held strictly accountable for performance shortfalls. As the process
of reform has reduced the number of assigned planning targets, re
laxed the pressures to meet others, and generally loosened political
constraints on local cadre behavior, the very structure that made it
possible to enforce birth quotas has been undermined. That is not
to say that local agents of the state are unable to enforce local
birth limits when they make a concerted effort to do so, or when
they are mobilized from above. Both central and local governments
remain capable of bringing formidable powers to bear on individual
couples. Nevertheless, market forces set loose since 1985 have fun
damentally altered the incentive structures on which rural enforce
ment depended. Individual provinces and local governments weigh
central pressures against local priorities, and discover that the ap
pearance of concern over population growth can substitute for fi
nancial investments. Beijing can afford to speak as if all projects
are equally important, but local leaders understand that they will
be rewarded first and foremost for improved economic indicators;
low birth rates will earn them applause, but no political or econom
ic clout.75 Similarly, grassroots cadres weigh the direct and indi
rect costs of rigorous enforcement against the risks of neglect; they
often conclude that it is more rational and less risky to implement
the letter of the law, i.e., collect fines for "illegal" births, and/or
falsify statistical reports, than to confront fellow villagers. And fi
nally, many couples have concluded that the rewards for having
only one child pale in comparison to the tangible and intangible
benefits of having two or more, even if the cost is migration to an
other locality or boarding one's children with cooperative relatives.
In short, partial market reforms have had the same effect in the
realm of birth planning that they have had in the economic
realm—creating skewed incentive systems that reward "undesir
able" behaviors and decisions, encourage corruption, and waste
scarce resources. Unlike the economic realm, however, these prob
lems have generated little attention outside China, since they have
helped to undercut the very concept of centrally planned, state-reg
ulated child-bearing, a concept that many find repugnant or im
moral. While this outcome may well be applauded and encouraged,
it is nevertheless worth noting that it has come at a cost. Millions
of children now live with a new kind of class stigma; they are
"black" (hei, as in black market) or "illegal" children with uncer
tain status and few prospects. If they are female, they are less
likely to be educated, whether legal or illegal. Studies by Chinese
scholars show that female education is the single most important
predictor of fertility; the failure to educate these children, there
fore, increases the likelihood that China's compulsory program will
be extended to a new generation. And finally, if declining invest
ment in birth planning allowed some couples to avoid compulsory
birth limits, it has also hindered the development of family plan
ning services that many couples want —a ready supply of reliable
75 Pei, "Thoughts on the Present Disarray," p. 64; Lu Xueyi and Zhang Houyi, "Peasant Di
versification, Problems, Remedies," Nongye jingji wenti (Problems of Agricultural Economics) 1
(January 1990), pp. 16-21, in JPRS-CAR 90-040, May 29, 1990, p. 65. This tendency toward ne
glect is by no means universal. Certain provinces, like Sichuan and Jiangsu, have been excep
tionally attentive to birth planning work. Elsewhere, individual leaders have been motivated by
personal conviction, not pressure from their superiors, to focus on birth limitation.
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and convenient contraceptives, high-quality medical services, and
improved maternal and infant care.
It is true, of course, that China's birth planning program can be
blamed for these side-effects. Without it, one might argue, there
would be no "illegal" children, and funds invested in the mission of
administering birth limits could be deflected to education, health
care, and non-compulsory family planning services. Unlike the eco
nomic and political sectors, however, where influential constituen
cies support greater market reform and democratization, even the
most tolerant advisors to the SFPC advocate a two-child limit.
With the specter of a population in excess of 1.5 billion by the
middle of the next century (even if current policies remain in
force), reform advocates are cautious about liberalization of birth
limits. More far-reaching economic or political reforms are there
fore unlikely to result in the abandonment of state-regulated child-
bearing. At best, they may produce a more moderate, comprehen
sive and genuinely service-oriented approach to family planning —
one that hopes for voluntary compliance but settles for less.
